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ABSTRACT 
 
RANDALL DENISON: Immigration and Naturalization Policies in Germany: Changing the 
Way We Examine the Development of Turkish Immigrants 
(Under the direction of Donald Searing) 
Turkish immigrants, residing in Germany, claim that the development of immigration 
and naturalization polices in conjunction with violent acts made by extremists is valid 
evidence that German nationals are motivated by racial prejudice. Consequently, they assert 
that individuals descending from Turkish ancestry are coerced to fully integrate into the 
national culture and transform themselves into “ideal Germans.” The study of ethnocentric 
intolerance in Germany is not a new issue in political science, but rather a long-term 
commitment to investigating and understanding the nature of social relations in the German 
Federal Republic. The conventional wisdom argues that the arrival and subsequent 
entrenchment of Turkish immigrants produced concern for economic competitiveness among 
German nationals. Under the belief that Turkish immigrants would easily obtain employment 
at lower wages and that they would request social assistance from the state, Germans would 
become increasingly intolerant and discriminatory towards all ethnic minorities, most 
especially Turks. I contend that the conventional wisdom fails to provide a sufficient causal 
explanation for the occurrence of ethnocentric intolerance. I find that while self-interest 
influences social relations, the relationship between Turks and Germans is not simply 
predicated on a conflict of economic interests. I also contend that a sufficient causal 
explanation for German-Turkish relations must take into consideration at least four variables: 
national identity, technocratic institutions, racial prejudice, and self-interest.    
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INTRODUCTION 
The main conception of tolerance is one in which self-interest determines the 
endurance of practices and persons. The conventional wisdom is that material needs and 
innate desires propel individuals forward and encourage them to commit actions intended to 
produce a positive outcome: the fulfillment of one’s own needs and desires. Even in 
situations when the outcome is less successful than originally projected, individuals’ actions 
are determined by conscious and subconscious forces.  This theoretical concept of tolerance 
is a gross underestimation because it excludes political or even sociological elements as a 
possible variables. Since these factors are not taken into consideration, the conventional 
wisdom is not capable of generating a sufficient causal explanation for intolerance. 
I define intolerance as the inability for an individual to accept, let alone endure, a 
person, place or object. Pertaining to the case of Turks in Germany, I define intolerance as an 
inability for residents within Germany to endure the mores, characteristics and presence of 
individuals with Turkish ancestry.  That definition does not imply nor should be inferred as 
stating that all Germans are unable or refuse to accept Turks. Rather, this line of logic 
indicates that the occurrence of ethnocentric violence and hate speech are attributed to a 
historical legacy built on a multitude of equally salient variables. I contend the examination 
of Turkish residents in Germany must take into consideration not only self-interest as a 
variable, but also sociological elements that are often considered to be unquantifiable. 
Though scholars frequently rebuff similar remarks, there is some inherent value in a merger  
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between conflict theories (e.g. realism) and ontological approaches (e.g. social identity 
theory). Such a union could show that intolerance is not merely a consequence resultant from 
the clash of competing viewpoints, but rather a clash of sociological elements. 
In the first section of this article, I propose that the case of Turks in Germany can best 
be explored through a theoretical model similar to the multivariate analysis developed by 
Paul Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn.  Sniderman and Hagendoorn’s analysis presents a 
normative union between ontological studies and conflict theories, which claims no single 
variable can stand alone and offer the best causal explanation. Standalone variables are 
insufficient because the causes behind ethnocentric actions transcend their limited 
peripheries. Instead, the ideal approach envisioned by Sniderman and Hagendoorn is termed 
“realistic conflict theory.” Under realistic conflict theory, sociological elements are treated as 
significant variables equal to the traditional self-interest variable. In the case of ethnic 
discrimination and racial violence in Germany, I propose that scholars consider the use of an 
analysis which examines issues through multiple lenses.  
I contend this model will offer a sufficient explanation for the current state of social 
relations between ethnic Turks and non-ethnic Turks in Germany. The state of social 
relations deserves attention, because the present tension serves as a symptom from the 
development of immigration and naturalization policies since the 1950s. These policies 
experienced a broad transformation from labor-exclusive to integration-oriented to open 
inclusion. A historical account will indicate the transition was motivated by subtle changes in 
the thought processes of German residents and, to a greater extent, the national 
consciousness. The shift in government policies can be attributed to the influence of 
institutions, self-interest, racial prejudice, and national identity. Furthermore, the historical 
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overview presents a particular question: why do ethnic Turks, especially those who were 
naturalized or born citizens, feel that they are perceived by their fellow citizens as Ausländer 
(foreigners)?” This article will show that a multivariate analysis can indicate the following: 
social tension exists between ethnic Germans and ethnic Turks; the development of 
immigration and naturalization policies influenced social relations; and the underlying causes 
are the role of institutions in the decision-making process, the perception of self-interest, a 
legacy of racial prejudice, and the importance on national identity. I begin with a brief 
discussion on a normative union between conflict theories and ontological approaches. Then, 
I provide an overview of immigration and naturalization policies from the 1960s to 2000s. 
Last, I examine the causes behind this development and the impact on social relations.
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
REALISTIC CONFLICT THEORY 
This section will present the theoretical framework for our case study. I contend that 
ontological studies and conflict theories by themselves are insufficient to explain social 
relations between ethnic Turks and ethnic Germans since each separate approach fails to 
address specific elements which are addressed by the other approach. Instead, the 
examination of social relations in Germany is best explained when conflict theories and 
ontological studies are incorporated into a single theoretical approach. The ideal approach 
likely will resemble realistic conflict theory as presented by Paul Sniderman and Louk 
Hagendoorn in their book titled When Ways of Life Collide. I will show that realistic conflict 
theory offers a model of multivariate analysis, incorporating sociological elements with the 
self-interest variable, which can be utilized to provide an adequate explanation for the 
occurrence of ethnocentric intolerance. 
Throughout their study of hostilities between Dutch citizens and Muslim immigrants, 
Sniderman and Hagendoorn propose a normative union built on the incorporation of 
ontological studies and conflict studies. That approach offers an adequate causal explanation 
for the occurrence of ethnocentric discrimination and violence; and, in so doing, 
demonstrates that multiple variables influence the emergence and development of social 
tension. One variable for the occurrence of conflicts between ethnicities is self-interest.  
Sniderman and Hagendoorn write: 
…it does not follow that those who say they fear change object out of a fear of 
change. They may have quite different concerns. They are not dissembling 
when they say they perceive a threat to their cultural identity, though no doubt 
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some are. But whether they recognize it or not, their root concern is about 
their economic well-being, not their cultural identity.1 
 
Self-interest is a significant variable behind the development of social relations between 
ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities. In a comparison of respondents, those individuals 
whose employment opportunities are jeopardized by competition from ethnic minorities are 
more likely to consider ethnic minorities as a considerable threat than those individuals 
whose employment opportunities are not jeopardized.  What’s more, self-interest does not 
necessitate the actual existence of a threat to one’s interests, but rather the perception that a 
threat exists.  In cases where one ethnic group holds a strategic advantage in the labor market 
over another ethnic group, members from the former group may exhibit anxiety even though 
economic concern is ostensibly unwarranted. This observation implies that the mere 
perception of a threat can influence interaction between ethnicities by magnifying the 
importance an individual places on the fulfillment of self-interest. 
Another salient variable is national identity. In a comparison of respondents, those 
individuals who attach meaning, or value, to the identity of their nation-state are more likely 
to be concerned about the preservation of the national identity than individuals who do not 
attach meaning. Sniderman and Hagendoorn are admittedly not surprised from this result. 
Social identity theory presupposes that individuals are driven by an insatiable need to 
evaluate themselves in opposition to neighboring individuals. This drive necessitates a 
bifurcated categorization of groups into individuals with similarities and individuals without 
similarities. The establishment of that distinction in turn produces the notion that one side is 
inherently superior to the other side. What surprised Sniderman and Hagendoorn was the 
                                                          
1 Paul M. Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn, When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and its Discontents 
in the Netherlands (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007): 125. 
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degree to which importance on identity increased sensitivity to political discourse.  In 
comparison of respondents, those individuals concerned about national identity are no more 
likely to support exclusionary policies designed to preserve the national identity than those 
who are not concerned. Accounting for respondents’ alignment on the political spectrum, 
importance on national identity increases sensitivity to political discourse. This result 
indicates the existence of a third salient variable: prejudice. 
Prejudice can be defined as “a readiness to belittle minorities, to dislike them, to shun 
them, to be contemptuous of them, and to feel hostility toward them.”2 Prejudice is a 
significant variable since it increases the likelihood that an individual will support ethnic 
discrimination. The positive correlation is dependent on two factors: objectification of social 
entities and universality across the political spectrum. In the first instance, prejudice 
objectifies members from ethnic minorities with artificial labels that establish stereotypical 
images which disregard differences and ascribe specific characteristics. This objectification 
fortifies the notion of irreconcilability: that ethnic majorities and minorities are diametric 
opposites. 3 In the second instance, prejudice is not restricted to any particular side of the 
political spectrum. Sniderman and Hagendoorn explain:  
No one supposes there is no prejudice on the [political] left. But the 
conventional wisdom that the danger lies to the political right tacitly assumes 
that being on the left to some degree immunizes one against the effects of 
intolerance. If one stops and gives some thought to the matter, however, the 
assumption is not obviously plausible. What reason is there to suppose that the 
psychology of intolerance changes depending on the political perspectives 
from which a person views the world? Intensely dislike minorities and you 
will be disposed to ill treat them whatever your political point of view.4 
 
                                                          
2 Ibid: 45. 
 
3 Ibid: 44. 
 
4 Ibid: 69. 
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The conventional wisdom is that prejudice solely impacts members of the political right. That 
perspective often portrays members of the political left as sacrosanct from ethnic 
discrimination. Sniderman and Hagendoorn boldly reject this assertion as a myth. Aggression 
towards ethnic minorities exists across the political spectrum regardless of party preferences.  
In summation, Sniderman and Hagendoorn provide us a comprehensive theoretical 
approach which successfully unites segments from ontological studies with those from 
conflict theories. I contend that the case of Turks in Germany can best be examined through a 
model of multivariate analysis since realistic conflict theory enables scholars to examine the 
degree to which self-interest, national identity and prejudice influence relations between 
ethnicities. The next section will provide an overview of the development of immigration and 
naturalization policies. Afterwards, I will examine causes behind this historical account with 
an emphasis on aforementioned variables. I propose the policies enacted by the German 
Federal Republic show that self-interest, national identity and prejudice are variables which 
scholars should take into consideration when examining cases of intolerance. 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION POLICIES 
This section aims to examine the development of immigration and naturalization 
policies from the early 1960s to the mid-2000s. It starts out with a discussion on the official 
invitation for foreign laborers to migrate to Germany from other European countries. Then, it 
discusses efforts utilized by the German state to discourage foreign laborers from 
establishing a permanent residence. Afterwards, it focuses on the liberalization of the 
naturalization policy following the conclusion that the labor-exclusive immigration policy 
failed to prevent the entrenchment of foreign laborers. This section will demonstrate that the 
state sought to maintain a division between German nationals and ethnic minorities via these 
immigration and naturalization policies. In the former case, the regulation of immigration 
was designed to prevent the formation of intimate connections. In the latter case, the 
naturalization process was utilized to preserve a legal distinction between those individuals 
who are considered “German” and those individuals who are not considered “German”. 
The Emergence of Turkish Residents 
The migration of foreign laborers to Germany was first conceived in the 1950s. The 
notion of an official invitation was inspired by unanticipated demands associated with the 
postwar recovery era. After the conclusion of the Second World War, the German Federal 
Republic began a campaign to fund redevelopment projects. These efforts in conjunction 
with the overall recovery of Western Europe as a whole produced a period of accelerated 
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economic growth, which exceeded initial projections. Due to this oversight and damages 
incurred from two major wars, the country suffered from a shortage of manual laborers, 
which impeded the national recovery from attaining its full potential. An official invitation to 
permit the entrance of Gastarbeiter (guest workers) from various nation-states was deemed a 
viable, albeit risky, solution to the labor shortage. In addition to diplomatic talks with other 
European countries, the German Federal Republic initiated negotiations with the Turkish 
Republic for the recruitment of laborers in 1961.  
Although the Gastarbeiter were perceived as a vital necessity to the postwar recovery 
process, the negotiation team from the German Federal Republic exhibited concerns. The 
negotiators were apprehensive about the creation of a bilateral agreement, because the 
national economy was projected to stabilize in the late 1960s. Estimates indicated the 
Gastarbeiter were needed only for a period of three to five years before the demand for labor 
would decline to sustainable levels. They hypothesized that the Gastarbeiter may refuse to 
return home after they began to benefit from higher wages and welfare benefits. What’s 
more, the negotiators held the belief that all Turks are Muslims. Even though the Republic of 
Turkey proclaimed itself to be a strict secular state, they were concerned that Turkish 
laborers might not acclimate to a non-Muslim environment; and that the immigration of 
Muslims might result in the emergence of Islamic traditions and the subsequent 
diminishment of the Gemeinshaft (harmonious community). 
On the opposing end, the negotiation team from the Turkish Republic was intent to 
dissuade the concerns exhibited by the German government. The successful formation of a 
bilateral agreement meant the transition of their nation-state from a poverty-ridden to a labor-
export country. While Germany experienced accelerated economic growth, Turkey suffered 
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from low growth and a high rate of unemployment. Turkish negotiators calculated that the 
exportation of laborers would decrease unemployment and improve popular support for 
government initiatives. Additionally, a bilateral agreement was seen as an opportunity to 
regulate the actions of foreign recruiters, levy foreign currencies, and increase the population 
of laborers with skilled trades.5 
The ratification of the bilateral agreement was predicated on the unconditional 
acceptance of concessions imposed by the German State. These stipulations were as follows: 
1. Work visas were limited to a length of three years and residence permits to two. 
 
2. Eligible candidates were required to participate in medical examinations, 
administrated by the German Liaison Office in Istanbul, with intent of identifying 
risks to both themselves and the Gemeinshaft.  
 
3. Familiennachzug (family reunions) between the Gastarbeiter and their relatives 
within the German Federal Republic were not permitted. 
 Noncompliance with these concessions meant the protraction, if not termination, of 
negotiations for the recruitment of laborers from Turkey. At initial glance, one could claim 
that the German state sought to preserve the integrity of its culture through the 
discouragement of integration. Contemporaneously, one could argue that the health, religious 
preferences, and skills set of Turkish citizens were taken in serious consideration. In addition 
to these provisions, ministries from each country oversaw administration and neutrality of the 
                                                          
5 Aytaç Eryılmaz, “40 Years in Germany: At home abroad,” Private View Spring  Edition (March 2002): 62 – 
63; Faruk Şen, “Forty year later: Turkish immigrants in Germany,” Private View Spring Edition (March 2002): 
28 – 29; Faruk Şen, “The Historical Situation of Turkish Migrants in Germany,” Immigrants & Minorities, Vol. 
2, Nos.2&3 (July/November 2003): 208 – 209; Oliver Razum, Nuriye N. Sahin-Hodoglugil, and Karin Polit, 
“Health, Wealth or Family Ties? Why Turkish Work Migrants Return from Germany,” Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (July 2005): 720; Filiz, Ovalı, Tavşan, Cengiz Tavşan, Ayşe Sağsöz, “The 
Reflections of the Attempts of Adaptation, Integration and Assimilation to Different Environments on Houses: 
A Study of Turks Living in Germany,” International Journal of Academic Research, Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 
2011): 739. 
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recruitment process. Employers, seeking to increase their rosters, submitted requisitions with 
information on the nature of the profession and the quantity of workers to the German 
Federal Work Office for verification and approval. Afterwards, requests were first transferred 
to the Liaison Office and then the Turkish Labor Exchange where applicants were screened 
before referred back to the Liaison Office. Eligible candidates who completed the second 
phase of the recruitment process (e.g. an interview and examinations) were granted visas, and 
shipped to Munich for registration and assignments.6 
 
Gradual Reforms to Immigration and Naturalization 
 Despite meticulous efforts made during the bilateral negotiations, the population of 
Turkish immigrants grew unabated. The preliminary number of laborers who migrated from 
Turkey was 7,116 individuals in 1961. Over the course of the next decade, the number 
exploded to 910,500 with negligible resistance. The sole recorded stagnation of the 
population occurred when levels remained constant between 1973 and 1974 (Table 1). The 
slowdown was likely resultant from the economic recession generated from the embargo on 
oil exportation imposed by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries; and the 
nullification of the bilateral work agreement between Germany and Turkey.    
                                                          
6 Aytaç Eryılmaz, “40 Years in Germany: At home abroad,” Private View Spring Edition: 63–64. 
Table 1: The Growth of Turkish Population in Germany 
Year Population Year Population 
1961 7,116 1980 1,462,400 
1965 132,800 1985 1,400,400 
1970 469,200 1990 1,694,649 
1973* 910,500 1995 2,014,320 
1974* 910,500 2000 1,998,536 
1975 1,077,100 2005 N/A 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office), Wiesbaden, Germany. 
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Although unforeseeable in the 1970s, three variables contributed to the entrenchment 
of ethnic Turks in Western Germany.  The first is the issue of Familiennachzug. Gastarbeiter 
argued that economic decline produced emotional and financial constraints which hindered 
their ability to sustain long distance relationships with their families, and necessitated a 
return to their homeland. This news stirred compassion among employers who had vested 
interests in the maintenance of their low-cost, trained laborers. The demand for reform 
coerced the German state to permit the entrance of spouses and offspring. A second variable 
is the identification of Western Germany as the home country. The growing population of 
ethnic Turks increased demand for European as well as Turkish-oriented commodities (e.g. 
döner, kibbeh). As Turks established lifestyles incorporating elements from German and 
Turkish culture, some individuals, especially children, built intimate connections with their 
newfound communities and identified themselves as Germans. The third variable is that 
ethnic Turks became accustomed to their living standards. Turkey suffered from mass civil 
disobedience, racial violence, comparatively lower educational standards, and limited 
economic opportunities. What’s more, the country underwent three distinct coup d’états 
which changed the nature of sociopolitical life and led to the emigration of human capital to 
Western Europe (e.g. intellectuals and refugees).7 
The combined strength of these variables produced a second population increase 
ranging from 1,077,000 ethnic Turks in 1975 to 1,400,400 in 1985 (Table 1). Given that the 
                                                          
7 Kutay Erdem, Ethnic Marketing for Turks in Germany: Influences on the Attitude Towards Ethnic Marketing: 
13; Faruk Şen, “Forty year later: Turkish immigrants in Germany,” Private View Spring Edition: 28; Simon 
Green, “The Legal Status of Turks in Germany,” Immigrants & Minorities, Vol. 2, Nos.2&3 (July/November 
2003): 230 – 233. For more information on the history of the Turkish Republic, see Sina Akşin, Turkey: From 
Empire to Revolutionary Republic Trans. Dexter H. Mursaloğlu (New York: New York University Press, 2007); 
Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003); Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, and 
Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands (New York: Palgrave MacMillan 2005). 
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population increased by 35%, the state offered financial incentives designed to encourage 
remigration. In particular, individuals were eligible to receive 10,500 deutsche marks (DM) 
(est. €5368) with the option of an additional 1,500 DM (est. €767) for each of their children. 
The distribution of these incentives were conditioned on the notarization of legal contracts 
“which stated [the signers] will never be allowed to live in Germany again.”8 The distribution 
of financial incentives were deemed a viable attempt to curtail immigrant entrenchment since 
it addressed two concerns: the pursuit of economic opportunities and a reconnection with 
cultural roots. Despite these considerations, the aggregate number of volunteers only ranged 
from 186,000 to 400,000 individuals. This evident failure shows that living standards found 
in Germany eclipsed those in Turkey.9 
As the total population of ethnic Turks rose from 1,400,400 in 1985 to 2,053,564 
individuals in 1999, political discourse pertaining to the treatment of immigrant minorities as 
citizens evolved. In the mid-1980s, roughly sixty percent of ethnic Turks had resided for a 
minimum of ten years. At the same time, the naturalization rate per year was an estimated 
0.3%. Simon Green argues that the “government policy traditionally made few concessions 
to the possibility that its large and settled immigrant population, and especially its 
descendants, might wish to become German nationals. Again, this approach rose out of the 
‘non-immigration country’ position…which explicitly defined naturalization as an 
                                                          
8 Kutay Erdem, Ethnic Marketing for Turks in Germany: Influences on the Attitude Towards Ethnic Marketing: 
14.  
 
9 Oliver Razum, Nuriye N. Sahin-Hodoglugil, and Karin Polit, “Health, Wealth or Family Ties? Why Turkish 
Work Migrants Return from Germany,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4: 720, 732; 
Edgar Klüsener, Turkish Immigrants in Germany and Their Cultural Conflicts (Munich: GRIN Verlag, 2007): 
5; David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky, Turkish Culture in German Society Today (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
1996): 83. 
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exceptional act.”10 The phrase ‘exceptional act’ refers to broad demands stipulated in the 
Einbürgerungsrichtlinien (1977 Guidelines on Naturalization). An eligible candidate for 
naturalization was required to prove a ten-year minimum of legal residence, demonstrate a 
commitment to German values, pay 5000 DM (est. €2556) for administrative fees, refuse to 
join ethnic associations, and possess citizenship from only one country.11  
 
These facts did not go unnoticed. Former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, during the reunification 
transition, insisted the failure of previous administrations to prevent the entrenchment of an 
                                                          
10 Simon Green, “The Legal Status of Turks in Germany,” Immigrants & Minorities, Vol. 2, Nos.2&3: 239. 
 
11 Elspeth Guild, C. A. Groenendijk, Sergio Carrera, Illiberal liberal states: immigration, citizenship, and 
integration in the EU (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2009): 92; Simon Green, “The Legal Status of 
Turks in Germany,” Immigrants & Minorities, Vol. 2, Nos.2&3: 239; Sarah Elise Wiliarty, The Postwar 
Transformation of Germany: Democracy, Prosperity, and Nationhood (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1999): 378 – 379; David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky, Turkish Culture in German Society Today: 91 – 92. 
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immigrant population necessitated that German citizens accept the inclusion of ethnic 
minorities. Low naturalization rates and the Einbürgerungsrichtlinien were considered 
evidence that members of ethnic minorities were dissuaded to integrate into German culture. 
This call for inclusion inspired the political elite to address the exclusionary elements of the 
naturalization process through the minor liberalization of the Auslaendergesetz (Alien Act) in 
1990. Under the reformed law, members of two subgroups were made immediate candidates 
for citizenship: residents of at least 15 years and individuals aged from 16 to 23 years old. As 
Figure 1 demonstrates, the increase in the naturalization rate for ethnic Turks coincides with 
the enactment of these reforms. Despite the positive outcome from the liberalization of the 
Auslaendergesetz, the naturalization policy continued to suffer from impediments. In 
particular, children born into non-national families were considered under German law as 
Ausländer. Consequently, they were required to willingly undergo naturalization upon 
reaching the age of adolescence. In addition, these children were forbidden from possessing 
citizenship from Germany and their country of origin. The issue of dual citizenship was not 
emotional or cultural, but rather economical. Green writes: “Until the mid-1990s, Turkish 
[naturalization] law limited inheritance to Turkish nationals, and the administrative 
procedure involved in obtaining release from one’s Turkish citizenship could take … three 
years.”12 In essence, the German state’s rejection of dual citizenship meant ethnic minorities 
were handed an obligatory choice: incur the costs of unconditional integration into or 
                                                          
12 Sarah Yentl Solari, “German Nationality: An Illustration of Institutionalized Discrimination” (Thesis 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science, 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, April 2008): 27. 
16 
 
exclusion from German culture. These limitations were addressed by members of the Social 
Democratic Party who proposed additional reforms to the Auslaendergesetz in 1999.13 
The second round of reforms is divided into five segments. First, the minimum length 
of legal residence was decreased from fifteen to eight years. Second, the principle of ius soli 
was introduced. After January 1st 1990, children were deemed natural-born citizens on the 
condition that one of their parents satisfied the first condition and held a valid residence 
permit.14 Third, the ban on dual citizenship was partially lifted. For instance, native-born 
children were entitled to possess dual citizenship until reaching the age of 23. Afterwards, 
their German citizenship was revoked unless they denounced the other citizenship in 
question. Fourth, verification of language proficiency was deemed mandatory for foreign 
nationals. Fifth, individuals were obligated to sign notarized pledges of loyalty to the German 
constitution. What’s more, these documents authorized security authorities to perform 
random loyalty tests without requiring just cause. These reforms were deemed a substantial 
success since naturalization rates for 1999 and 2000 were comparatively higher than 
previously recorded levels.15 
The first and second round of reforms to the Auslaendergesetz inspired an opportunity 
for further amendment. In July 2001, the Süssmuth Commission released a report; in which a 
proposal for a new immigration law was made. Then, the Bundesministerium des Innern 
                                                          
13 Elspeth Guild, C. A. Groenendijk, Sergio Carrera, Illiberal liberal states: immigration, citizenship, and 
integration in the EU: 92 – 93; Sarah Yentl Solari, “German Nationality: An Illustration of Institutionalized 
Discrimination”: 27 – 29; Simon Green, “The Legal Status of Turks in Germany,” Immigrants & Minorities, 
Vol. 2, Nos.2&3: 239 – 240; David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky, Turkish Culture in German Society Today: 92 
– 93.  
 
14 Children who were born prior to January 1st 1990 are still considered as ‘foreigners,’ not citizens by birth. 
 
15 Sarah Yentl Solari, “German Nationality: An Illustration of Institutionalized Discrimination”: 30 – 31; Simon 
Green, “The Legal Status of Turks in Germany,” Immigrants & Minorities, Vol. 2, Nos.2&3: 240 – 241. 
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(Federal Ministry of Interior) drafted legislation titled the Zuwanderungsgesetz (Immigration 
Act). The Zuwanderungsgesetz was designed “to modernize German immigration and 
residence policy, and in many ways represented the culmination of the country’s very gradual 
transformation into a self-acknowledged country of immigration.”16 The draft recommended 
the formation of quotas for immigrants with developed skill sets; easier entrance for child 
immigrants; more efficient identification of refugees; streamlined residence permit system 
and compulsory training courses pertaining to culture and linguistics. After consultation with 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht den Bundesratsbeschluss (Federal Constitutional Court of the 
Federal Council), the Bundestag (German Parliament) and the Bundesrat (Federal Council) 
ratified the Zuwanderungsgesetz. 
Immigration and naturalization policies of the German Federal Republic underwent a 
comprehensive makeover from labor-exclusive to integration-oriented to open inclusion. The 
historical overview suggests that the transition favored the easement of concerns, which 
reverberated among members of ethnic minorities, in response to a change within the 
national consciousness. One must not infer that the entire nation underwent of period of 
sociological change since ethnic discrimination continued to exist. Instead, the historical 
overview indicates that a segment of German nationals started to accept the presence of 
immigrant minorities. Those observations present a set of questions. First, what is the best 
causal explanation for the transformation of immigration and naturalization policies? Second, 
in what manner has the transition influenced social relations between Turks and Germans? 
To what extent do members from each subgroup consider each other equal citizens? The next 
section will endeavor to provide an answer for these queries. 
                                                          
16 Simon Green, “The Legal Status of Turks in Germany,” Immigrants & Minorities, Vol. 2, Nos.2&3: 242. 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
A REALISTIC CAUSAL EXPLANATION 
The compilation of research material pertaining to the case of ethnic Turks offers the 
opportunity to test realistic conflict theory as presented by Sniderman and Hagendoorn. I 
propose that the transition of immigration and naturalization policies was influenced by four 
factors: a network of institutions, self-interest, racial prejudice, and national identity. I also 
propose that these four factors had a significant impact on social relations between ethnic 
Turks and ethnic Germans. This section argues that realistic conflict theory offers a sufficient 
causal explanation for ethnocentric intolerance. I begin with a detailed examination of the 
aforementioned factors with regard to their impact on immigration and naturalization 
policies. Then, I present a brief synopsis of social relations between Turks and Germans.  
The influential role of institutions 
In his research on the development of citizenship policies, Michael Minkenberg 
proposes the reforms instituted during the 1990s were both a conceptual break from the 
traditional wisdom that ‘Germany is not a country of immigration,’ and appropriate means to 
ease immigrant minorities’ access to employment opportunities and welfare benefits. In the 
1970s, a report on the status of immigrants was released by a joint commission composed of 
representatives from the federal and state governments. In this document, the authors urged 
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the state to promote “full social integration of foreign workers and their families,” but also 
encourage “foreign workers and their families to return to their home countries.”17    
Minkenberg points out that the contradictory nature of the document was resultant 
from the preexistence of the Christian Democratic welfare state. Unlike the other main 
variants, the Christian Democratic model influenced the policy-making process through the 
establishment of a network where political parties, lobbies, and private businesses competed 
for political dominance. Immigration and naturalization policies were no different; their 
future was not directly predicated on the outcome of national elections or the will of the 
majority. Instead, a specific network, including the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal 
Employment Agency), the Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (Federal Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs) and private businesses, oversaw their development in an 
administrative and apolitical manner. This explanation is appropriate since it at least clarifies 
the decision over the allowance of Familiennachzug in the 1970s.18 Given private businesses 
held a position of influence, the acquisition of their support was a necessary success for the 
Gastarbeiter who longed to reunite with their families, but decidedly remained within the 
territorial confines of the host country. Were it not for employers’ concerns regarding their 
labor pools’ maintenance and overall productivity, the likelihood that private businesses 
would support the authorization of Familiennachzug might have been smaller. 
 Based on these observations, it is more apparent that a network of institutions played 
a role in the development of immigration and naturalization policies through joint 
collaboration and implementation of administrative practices designed to stir the interest of 
                                                          
17 Michael Minkenberg, “The Politics of Citizenship in the New Republic,” West European Politics Vol. 26, 
No. 4 (2003): 220. 
 
18 Ibid: 220–221. 
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foreign laborers and foster their initial migration to the German Federal Republic. It would 
be a considerable miscalculation, however, to presume that institutions are solely responsible 
for the development of social relations, considering that additional variables are involved. 
Self-interest as an Explainable Variable 
Minkenberg posits that the development of immigration and naturalization policies, 
via a network of institutions, positioned ethnic minorities into a precarious situation where 
they were offered social rights, but simultaneously denied political ones. What’s more, he 
posits that social concessions to ethnic minorities resulted in the promotion of ‘social welfare 
chauvinism’ (the notion that foreigners are not entitled access to the nation’s wealth).  His 
analysis leads readers to the belief that the national unification further promoted the 
perception of welfare chauvinism among citizens residing in the former Eastern bloc. 
Accounting for residence, East Germans were more likely to feel resentful towards 
immigrant minorities, because of limitations inherent to the West German welfare model. In 
particular, the model was designed to counteract social inequalities through high wages and 
state protectionism. The national unification incorporated two distinctly different regions 
under a single welfare model. Whereas living standards for West Germans were accounted 
for, the welfare model was incapable of addressing social inequalities among East Germans, 
who suffered from comparatively higher unemployment levels and regional impoverishment. 
Sensitivities towards welfare chauvinism resulted in the entrenchment of diametric attitudes 
towards the immigration of migrant groups.  
 Minkenberg examines the impact of welfare chauvinism on attitudes towards the 
immigration of different migrant groups between 1991 and 2000, while accounting for 
respondents’ place of residence. In a comparison of individuals, West Germans are just as 
likely to support partial regulation of migrant groups from EU and non-EU countries as East 
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Germans (respectfully 57.25% and 63.5% compared to 60.5% and 54.5%). A distinct 
difference in attitudes, however, occurs when support for inclusionary and exclusionary 
policies are considered. The former tended to support the unregulated inclusion of migrant 
laborers from EU and non-EU countries (33.5% and 9.25%), whereas the latter tended to 
support exclusionary policies designed to forbid further immigrants from entering into the 
country (27% and 40.25%). The difference in attitudes indicates that while a relatively small 
subgroup tended to prefer a complete prohibition on immigration, comparatively more East 
Germans than West Germans share anxieties about the growing population of immigrant 
minorities. Thus, this examination of welfare chauvinism demonstrates that self-interest is 
also a likely variable which influences social relations between Germans and Turks. 
 
 It would be remiss to infer, however, that Minkenberg’s analysis is free from 
criticism. In particular, it is difficult to assess the significance of self-interest as a variable 
given that the survey responses do not account for either the respondents’ ethnicity or the 
ethnicities of the migrant groups. Consequently, we cannot be certain how the population 
Table 2 
Attitudes towards Immigration of Different Migrant Groups to Germany (%) 
  West   East 
  1991 1992 1996 2000  1991 1992 1996 2000 
Labor migrants from EU countries          
Without regulation 34 35 33 32  13 13 11 13 
Partial regulation 56 56 55 62  62 63 51 66 
Prohibited regulation 10 9 12 7  25 24 38 21 
          
Labor migrants from non-EU countries          
Without regulation 11 10 8 8  4 4 4 4 
Partial regulation 61 62 59 72  56 59 46 57 
Prohibited regulation 28 28 33 20  36 36 49 40 
Source: Michael Minkenberg, “The Politics of Citizenship in the New Republic,” West European 
Politics Vol. 26, No. 4 (2003): 234. 
22 
 
responds to the immigration of individuals who are identified as ethnic Turks. Despite this 
uncertainty, there is sufficient evidence to speculate that concerns regarding economic well-
being produce a readiness to dislike individuals who are not deemed as Germans.  That 
negative disposition combined with limited evidence necessitates the examination of 
additional variables.  
Racial Prejudice: Myth or Factor? 
The incorporation of prejudice as a salient variable will reveal two observations: 
ethnic Turks feel that ethnic Germans perceive them as ‘foreigners,’ and that the self-interest 
variable alone does not offer the best causal explanation.  Let’s begin with a recent case 
which received international attention in no small part due to Chancellor Angela Merkel. On 
February 23rd 2012, Mrs. Merkel took the center stage of a memorial service which was held 
for ten victims of ethnocentric violence and their families. Instead of presenting an uplifting 
speech, she provided a sober address, in which she requested the victims’ families to accept 
the sincere condolences of the German state and find the capacity to forgive it.  
The victims, eight of whom were ethnic Turks, were targeted and murdered by 
unknown assailants. Between 2000 and 2011, security authorities investigated the individual 
cases; probed for potential causes ranging from interpersonal disagreements to illegal 
activities; and repeatedly failed to identify a plausible connection among the victims. In 
November 2011, it was discovered that the murder spree was committed by a covert terrorist 
cell self-proclaimed as the Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist 
Underground). The breakthrough was resultant not from eleven years of police investigation, 
but rather from the examination of evidence pertaining to a criminal case that was originally 
considered a separate incident. Journalists, citizens, and other members from the international 
community described this discovery as a severe blunder and publicly criticized both the 
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security authorities and the German state itself.  Aiman Mazyek, the head of the Central 
Muslim Council in Germany, is quoted saying, “We cannot go back to ‘business as usual,’ 
this is a watershed. In the past we have dismissed racism as a fringe problem or a neo-Nazi 
affair, but racism is eating its way into the center of society.”19 Accusations such as this 
necessitated a response from the Bundestag decidedly enacted a cross-party resolution, in 
which it expressed “deep shame,” authorized a “parliamentary inquiry,” and vowed “to 
improve coordination among national and regional intelligence authorities.”20 These 
concessions did not appease critics, primarily because they were deemed as insufficient 
measures which failed to address a much larger issue. Ekin Deligöz, a parliamentarian for 
Die Grünen (The Greens) writes:  
By concentrating on the procedure and not the heart of the matter, this leads to 
a downplay of the real issue, that the far right is as strong as it has ever 
been…We still trust our German neighbors, the pharmacist on the corner or 
my workman, but the country – the politicians, the government – we don’t 
trust them… There is a feeling that they speak of a nation under the rule of the 
law, but then throw up a wall when it is about our rights. 
 
Members of ethnic minorities feel that the national culture and political system are designed 
to pressure – if not outright coerce – them into adopting customs perceived as authentically 
‘German.’ In addition, ethnic minorities feel modern Germans will perceive all individuals 
who are not ethnically German as ‘outsiders,’ regardless of their adoption of authentic 
customs. Among ethnic Turks, the conventional wisdom is that they are perceived not as 
                                                          
19 Alexandra Hudson, “Merkel apologizes for neo-Nazi murders,” The Montreal Gazette, February 24 2012: 
<http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Merkel+apologizes+Nazi+murders/6201791/story.html> {accessed 
March 22 2012} 
 
20 David Crossland, “Germany holds state ceremony for Muslims murdered by neo-Nazis,” The National, 
February 24 2012: <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/europe/germany-holds-state-ceremony-for-muslims-
murdered-by-neo-nazis>; Helen Pidd, “German parliament ‘ashamed’ by neo-Nazi murders,” The Guardian, 
November 22 2011: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/22/german-parliament-shame-neo-nazi-
murders> {accessed March 22 2012} 
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fellow Germans, but instead as mere vermin conspiring to feed off the welfare state, dilute 
the national gene pool, and undermine all that is considered to be “German.”. One male 
expresses his displeasure towards similar derogatory statements:  
Yes, Turkey is my homeland, but that’s it! I identify myself only partly with 
it. It is the land in which I was born, grew up, went to school…And there are 
certain things that I appreciate about it. But with the land Turkey, I have very 
little to do. I do not accept the system there, this nationalistic 
structure…this…even racist and Islamist structure. I do not want to live there; 
not now and not in the future…and I do not want to imagine a future for my 
children there.21 
Moreover, racial prejudice conceivably serves as a variable since neither the murder of ten 
individuals nor the aforementioned ethnocentric statements are new phenomena. Roughly 
130 individuals, including immigrants, asylum seekers and displaced persons, were murdered 
for ethnocentric reasons between 1989 and 2006. In 2007, 11 incidents of hate crimes 
directed towards private businesses were reported. The Federal Criminal Police Office 
reported that “politically and racially motivated crimes by the far right hit a record high of 
more than 20,000 incidents in 2008. Between January 2010 and the summer of 2011, 100 
party officials from the political left were victims of arson, vandalism, robberies, and other 
life-threatening crimes.22  
Racial prejudice is not solely confined to these random incidents of violence; but 
rather expands outward to the political spectrum. The most infamous case is the 
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22 Anonymous, “Far-Right Attacks Reached New Record in Germany in 2007,” March 20 2008: 
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Nationaldemokratische Partei (NPD, or National Democratic Party); the oldest nationalist 
organization in existence since the demise of the Deutsches Reich (German Reich) in 1945. 
At its inception, the NDP was organized by patriots and nationalists who disagreed with the 
philosophical principles embedded within liberalism and communism. These members 
offered a policy platform founded on an idiosyncratic mixture of Nazism and conservatism; 
in which they contended for the complete reunification of the nation-state and removal of all 
foreign nationals. Among the strategic tactics utilized to stimulate popular support for these 
policies, the most relevant one is the arousal of Fremdenfeindlichkeit (a dislike of anything 
foreign). John David Nagle contends that “[t]he NPD seeks to capitalize on a deep-seated 
xenophobia which is focused mainly against Americans, foreign workers… and Jews. 
Connected with this xenophobia is the … claim that foreign influences are destroying or 
polluting German culture.”23 In his definitive examination of the NPD, Nagle provides a 
comprehensive analysis emphasizing its historical development, campaign strategies and 
voter profile. Even though the NPD suffered an electoral defeat to the Christian Democratic 
Union during the 1970s and has failed repeatedly to extend its political power to include the 
federal government, its rhetoric and existence is dependent on the presence of deep-seated 
xenophobia: a remnant from the heyday of Nationalsozialismus (National Socialism).  
Under the Deutsches Reich, the entrenchment of xenophobia was resultant from 
bilateral oratory utilized by the Nazis. On the one hand, party leaders incorporated openly 
racist commentary into their public speeches. In a speech titled, “The Jews or US…,” Robert 
Ley writes: 
If the Jew wants to fight, it is fine with us. We have wanted that fight for a 
long time. There is no room in the world for the Jews any more. The Jew or 
                                                          
23 John David Nagle, The National Democratic Party: Right Radicalism in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Berkeley and Los Angelos: University of California Press, 1970): 84. 
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us, one of us will have to go. We know that the Jew will lose, that he and his 
devilish, life-denying and destructive doctrines will be destroyed.24 
 
Despite the aggressive undertones within this overt declaration of war against individuals of 
Judaist faith, the xenophobic tendencies of Nazism were often overlooked by the average 
German citizen. Claudia Koonz contends that one of the most attractive aspects of Nazism 
itself was not the appeals to anti-Semitism or geopolitical expansionism, but rather the calls 
for national renewal and self-sacrifice. In The Nazi Conscience, Koonz explains this 
sociological observation: 
When addressing general audiences, devoted Nazis muted their poisonous 
racism and instead foregrounded ethnic fundamentalism. They spoke about 
their ‘longing for inner freedom, for the joy in work itself and not merely as a 
means of growing rich. National Socialism is nothing more than the greatest 
celebration of life.’ … Rather than dwelling on biology and race, they 
emphasized the spiritual qualities of the Volk. An inclusive call for Germanic 
renewal had the potential to ameliorate non-Nazi teachers’ disenchantment 
with the day-to-day bureaucracy and enable them to overlook the fanaticism 
of some fellow teachers.25 
 
The notion of self-sacrifice, supplemented by a perceptual need for national renewal, 
motivated individuals, regardless of their respective standings within civil society, to set 
aside materialistic concerns for an alleged greater cause: the preservation of the Vaterland, 
Gemeinshaft and the Führer himself. As the average citizen became desensitized to evident 
racial nuances embedded within the National Socialistic rhetoric, xenophobia gradually 
became an integral, albeit cloaked, part of their thought process. These observations indicate 
that racial prejudice impacts the manner in which Germans perceive and interact with 
immigrants. The absence of statistical evidence, however, necessitates consideration of 
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25 Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience (Cambridge: Havard University Press, 2005): 144. 
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additional factors. Koonz’s discussion on the use of national renewal as a propaganda tactic 
brings in question the final variable which this article will discuss: national identity.   
A Fourth Variable: National Identity 
In 2007, Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox tested the following question: is 
opposition to the immigration of ethnic minorities in Europe driven by fears of labor-market 
competition? Hainmueller and Hixcox performed their experiment by analyzing survey 
responses, pertaining to attitudes towards immigration, shown in the 2003 European Social 
Survey. Contrary to Minkenberg’s assessment of welfare chauvinism and other economic 
models which claim that tolerance is impacted by labor-market competition, their results 
indicate that ethnocentric intolerance is not influenced by immigrants’ places of birth, skill 
attributes, and employment status. Though economic models assume that the influx of 
immigrants has adverse effects on the real earnings of native-born workers, recent empirical 
evidence suggests that the actual effect is rather limited, and that the conventional belief 
about the relationship between labor-market competition and ethnocentric intolerance is 
inherently flawed. Hainmueller and Hiscox suggest that ethnocentric intolerance, or anti-
immigration sentiments, is influenced by the relationship between respondents’ educational 
levels and concerns about national identity. The findings are as follows:  
[E]ducated respondents are significantly less racist and place far greater value 
on cultural diversity in society, and they are also more likely to believe that 
immigration generates benefits for their national economy as whole. … For 
those who support immigration and worry about the growth of extremist, often 
violent, anti-immigration movements in Europe, the conclusions … are not 
encouraging. … Anti-immigration sentiments appear to be far more 
powerfully associated with cultural values that have more to do with 
conceptions of national identity than they do with concerns about personal, 
economic circumstances.26  
                                                          
26 Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox, “Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration 
in Europe,” International Organization, 61: 436 – 437.  
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These results suggest that the demarcation between tolerance and intolerance is amplified by 
the degree to which respondents’ educational levels influences the importance of national 
identity. In a comparison of individuals, those who are more educated are less likely to 
perceive the effects of immigration as a national threat than those who are not educated.  
These results also indicate that financial assistance, job-creation programs, and other 
conventional measures employed by statesmen and politicians will not alleviate ethnocentric 
intolerance since such an objective could only be achieved through the complete eradication 
of national identity. Instead, Hainmueller and Hiscox hypothesize that adjustments to 
educational programs might result in increased public opinion for inclusionary policies and 
mitigated social hostilities. While the soundness of this hypothesis remains to be seen, 
national identity is also a variable that influences social relations between Germans and Turks.  
Based on the evidence presented within this section, three variables impact the 
development of ethnocentric intolerance towards ethnic Turks: self-interest, racial prejudice, 
and national identity. Although the lack of further statistical evidence prevents us from 
making conclusive remarks, it seems that these variables have a role in the development of 
social relations in Germany. The federal government’s extension of social rights to include 
Turkish residents has likely resulted in welfare chauvinism, economic resentment, and, more 
broadly, concern for self-interest. Self-interest in conjunction with emphasis on preservation 
of the national identity has likely heightened a readiness to dislike ethnic minorities and 
thereby compelled individuals towards intolerance. This conclusion would suggest that 
Sniderman and Hagendoorn’s realistic conflict theory provides an adequate causal explanation 
for the case of Turks in Germany. However, our findings also indicate that other factors not 
necessarily covered under realistic conflict theory might contribute to the emergence and 
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advancement of ethnocentric intolerance. The role of institutions proves this point. 
Technocratic administrations (e.g. the Bundesagentur für Arbeit and the Bundesministerium 
für Arbeit und Soziales) are likely responsible for the progress of immigration and citizenship 
policies; the creation of legal distinctions between ‘German’ and ‘Auslander;’ and the 
promotion of low naturalization rates. Consequently, one cannot assume social interaction 
between Germans and Turks is only affected by self-interest, prejudice, and national identity. 
  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Political scientists often disregard the salience of sociological elements when 
examining the development of tolerance. The traditional viewpoint has revolved around the 
notion that concern for economic well-being produces perceptual differences and conflicts of 
interest. This article rejects that proposition. On the one hand, self-interest is a significant 
variable that influences the manner in which individuals interact with one another. The 
examination of ethnic Turks residing in Germany confirms that statement. Welfare 
chauvinism, as Minkenberg demonstrates, increases the likelihood that a resident will support 
exclusionary or anti-immigrant policies. At the same time, it is not simply the case that self-
interest is the predominant variable behind human interaction. Realistic conflict theory 
correctly postulates that social interaction cannot be reduced to a single variable or a numeric 
code consisting of ones and zeros. Instead, social interaction between two or more groups 
must be perceived as a wide-sweeping process where multiple factors are involved.  
The second section of this article provides an overview of the development of 
immigration and naturalization policies. This historical account demonstrates that the 
German state’s regulation of foreign laborers’ entrance has experienced a gradual 
transformation from labor-exclusive to integration-oriented to open inclusion. The third 
section provides a causal explanation for the manner in which these policies developed by 
highlighting the existence of ethnocentric intolerance and its likely causes. An examination 
of self-interest, racial prejudice and national identity presents us with three results: (1) these 
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factors collectively influenced the development of immigration and naturalization policies; 
(2) the occurrence of ethnocentric violence is likely tied the role of these variables in German 
culture; and (3) realistic conflict theory, as laid down by Phil Sniderman and Louk 
Hagendoorn, is a viable approach capable of sufficiently examining alleged cases of 
ethnocentric intolerance. 
As already stated above, it is premature and rather careless to think that self-interest, 
racial prejudice and national identity provide a complete explanation for ethnocentric 
intolerance in the German Federal Republic. Considering the impact from institutions on the 
policy-making process, there is sufficient justification for scholars to perform further studies 
on the causes and effects of intolerance within any given community. This supposition 
necessitates that scholars seek opportunities where they may perform related research and 
contribute to the academic community. Let us take the NDP for an example. To what extent 
has the organization’s evident anti-immigrant platform influenced the decision-making 
process of registered voters? How could scholars measure the NDP’s impact on intolerance 
among registered voters? Accounting for other variables (e.g. self-interest), how is the NDP’s 
impact affected? In a hypothetical situation, the results could indicate one of two scenarios. 
The first scenario is that Germans are more likely to support exclusionary policies when 
taking into consideration the NDP. This would indicate that accusations made by ethnic 
Turks are reflective of the general sentiment within the NDP’s voting bloc. The second 
scenario is that a majority of Germans do not tend to support the exclusion of immigrant 
minorities despite the campaign strategies and outreach programs utilized by the NDP. This 
would suggest that accusations of racial discrimination might be misplaced or in error. In 
either case, the aforementioned example illustrates that further studies on the case of Turks in 
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Germany are sufficient and necessary in order to identity other variables and determine their 
significance. Once additional areas of interest are addressed, scholars then theoretically can 
present a complete explanation for ethnocentric intolerance in Germany. 
Although this article provides a foundation for scholars to examine non-related cases 
of ethnocentric intolerance, one must not misconstrue that the variables influencing social 
relations between ethnic Turks and ethnic Germans are applicable to all other cases of 
intolerance. The traditional notion of an absolute truth is an anachronism, long since 
disproven by nineteenth-century scholars and their subsequent acolytes. The modern wisdom 
is that while circumstances can share similarities, each case of ethnocentric intolerance is 
inherently different to some measurable degree. The case of Turks in Germany and the 
influential variables therein might not necessarily be applicable to the case of Kurds in the 
Netherlands, Japanese immigrants in the United States, Hungarians in Slovakia, or even 
displaced Roma in Italy. Therefore, we must tread with the utmost caution and patience when 
examining ethnocentric intolerance through the lenses of realistic conflict theory.     
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